2023 RLLR 235
Citation: 2023 RLLR 235
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: December 21, 2023
Panel: Lorna Farmer
Counsel for the Claimant(s): Robert Donald Stevens
Country: China
RPD Number: VC3-09289
Associated RPD Number(s): N/A
ATIP Number: A-2024-01133
ATIP Pages: N/A
DECISION
introduction
[1] This is the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) in the claim of XXXX XXXX as a citizen of China who is claiming refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the “Act”).[1]
ALLEGATIONS
[2] The following is a brief summary of the claimant’s allegations I find relevant to the current decision. A full summary of his allegations is found in his Basis of Claim (BOC) form and narrative.[2] The claimant is a 21-year-old male who was born in Guangdong. He fears persecution at the hands of the Chinese authorities due to his political views. The claimant believes in democracy and the individual freedoms associated with basic human rights. In 2019 he began criticizing the Chinese government on a few social media platforms, always using a fake name. In XXXX 2023 he arrived in Canada and then began making public posts against the government using his actual name. In XXXX, he also attended public demonstrations to protest against the government of China.
Determination
[3] I find the claimant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Act for the reasons that follow.
ANALYSIS
Identity
[4] I find the claimant’s personal and national identity is established on a balance of probabilities by a copy of his People’s Republic of China passport in evidence.[3]
Credibility
[5] When claimants affirm to tell the truth, this creates a presumption that their allegations are true unless there is reason to doubt their truthfulness. Based on the claimant’s testimony at the hearing and the documents in evidence, I have noted no serious credibility issues. He testified in a straightforward manner, and there were no inconsistencies between his BOC narrative and his statements at the hearing.
[6] The claimant has also provided documentary evidence in support of his claim, including numerous samples of his social media posts and photos of himself at a demonstration in XXXX. After reviewing the documents, I have no reason to doubt their authenticity and I therefore find they are credible evidence. I place full weight on these documents in assessing this claim.
[7] I find that the claimant has established on a balance of probabilities that he is a citizen of China who is opposed to the government. Overall, I accept the central allegations of his claim on a balance of probabilities. I find that the claimant has established a subjective fear of persecution in China.
Nexus
[8] In order to satisfy the definition of a “Convention refugee”, found in section 96 of the Act, a claimant must establish that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. I find the claimant’s allegations establish a nexus to the Convention ground of political opinion. As such, I have examined this claim under section 96 of the Act.
Well-founded fear of persecution
[9] I find that the claimant’s fears of persecution are supported by the objective evidence in the National Documentation Package for China (NDP).[4] Item 1.10 says that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has little tolerance for public dissent or opposition, on a wide range of matters considered politically sensitive, including social stability, the legitimacy of central authorities, and one-party rule. Even though the Constitution of China says that citizens enjoy freedom of speech, of the process of assembly, of association of possession and demonstration, in practice a wide range of topics are considered sensitive and are censored. People who advocate for human rights and their families, are subject to surveillance, threats, and detention. Social media is heavily censored; algorithms, along with a large number of human staff, patrol Chinese online media to identify and censor any mention of sensitive topics. Social media users in China must register with their real names, and the content they create can be used against them in criminal proceedings.
[10] Item 2.4 mentions that the human rights situation across China, continued to deteriorate in 2021 and into 2022, and that there are tight controls and restrictions on online freedom of expression that is continuing. It notes that with President Xi Jinping at the helm, the Chinese government doubled down on repression inside and outside the country in 2021. Beijing’s information manipulation has become pervasive. The government censors, punishes dissent, propagates disinformation, and tightens the reigns on tech giants. The once cacophonous internet is now dominated by pro-government voices that report to the authorities on people whose views they deem insufficiently nationalistic. Authorities harassed, detained, or prosecuted numerous people for their online posts and private chat messages, that were critical of the government, bringing trumped up charges of spreading rumors, picking quarrels, and provoking trouble and insulting the country’s leaders. A 2021 Wall Street Journal report found that 58 Chinese users were punished with prison sentences, between six months and four years since 2017, for their posts on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, which are all banned platforms in China. The government fires people for speeches deemed unpatriotic and continued to suppress online content, not in line with core socialist values.
[11] Further, at Item 2.7 is the Freedom House report, which says that China’s authoritarian regime has become increasingly repressive in recent years and that the ruling CCP continues to tighten control, over all aspects of life and governance including a staged bureaucracy, the media, online speech, religious practice, universities and businesses, and civil society associations, and it has undermined an earlier series of modest rule of law reforms. The CCP leader and state President has consolidated personal power to a degree not seen in China for decades. This report says that state management of the telecommunications infrastructure enables the blocking of websites, removal of smartphone applications from the domestic market, and mass deletion of social media posts and user accounts that touch on banned political, social, economic, and religious topics. It also says that thousands of websites have been blocked, many for years including major news and social media hubs like the New York Times, The BBC, YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. Numerous new rules and regulations governing the media and internet usage came into effect during 2021, including measures that restricted news dissemination and contributed to the banning of mobile apps, focused on minority languages, viable content, and foreign language learning, among other topics.
[12] Citizens continue to be charged and sentenced to sometimes long prison terms for critical or satirical social media posts. In addition to criminal punishment, internet users face account deletions, job dismissals, arbitrary detention, and police interrogation in response to comments made on social media platforms. The government’s ability to monitor citizens’ lives and communications has increased dramatically in recent years, inhibiting online and offline conversations. Social media applications like WeChat closely monitor user discussions, to ensure conformity with government content restrictions. Surveillance cameras now frequently augmented with facial recognition software, cover many urban areas and public transportation, and these networks are expanding into rural regions and devices used by police to quickly extract and scan data from smartphones have spread nationwide.
[13] The claimant testified that starting in 2019 he began to understand that the CCP had been brainwashing its citizens with false information and he started making online posts using a fake name and a server where he could not be identified by the state. He believed the government was engaged in inhumane activities and he could see that it suppressed any public voice in opposition. He learned of Canada’s refuge protection system, and he traveled to Canada in order to claim refugee status. After he arrived in XXXX 2023, he began to post openly on social media, and he attended several demonstrations against the government of China. He did this because he deeply believes in democracy and freedom of speech, all in opposition to the CCP.
[14] Based on all the evidence before me, including the claimant’s narratives and disclosures, his testimony at the hearing and the above objective evidence, I find the claimant’s fears of persecution in China are well founded. The claimant may be arrested or face prison sentences due to his political views and his anti-state activities.
State Protection
[15] I find that state protection would not be available to the claimant in China because the agent of persecution is the state who could investigate the claimant for his political views based on his online activity and public protests. I find that the claimant has rebutted the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence.
Internal Flight Alternative
[16] I have also considered whether the claimant could live safely in another part of China. Based on his circumstances and the objective evidence that I have already referred to, I find that he faces a serious possibility of persecution throughout the country. Therefore, there is no viable internal flight alternative for him in China.
CONCLUSION
[17] For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the claimant is a Convention refugee. I therefore accept his claim.
——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———
[1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
[2] Exhibit 2.
[3] Exhibit 1.
[4] Exhibit 3. National Documentation Package for China, 31 October 2023.