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2019 RLLR 194

Citation: 2019 RLLR 194
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: August 2, 2019
Panel: Jeffrey Brian Gullickson
Counsel for the Claimant(s): Raphael Vagliano
Country: Egypt
RPD Number: MB7-06938
Associated RPD Number(s): MB7-06961, MB7-11944
ATIP Number: A-2020-00518
ATIP Pages: 001351-001024

REASONS FOR DECISION

INTRODUCTION

[1]       Ms. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, the principal claimant, is a citizen of Egypt, according to her passport submitted as evidence. Her daughter, XXXX XXXX XXXX, and son, XXXX XXXX XXXX, are citizens of the United States Of America (US), according to their passports submitted as evidence. They are all claiming refugee protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

[2]       I appointed XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as designated representative for the associate minor child claimants, XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXIn rendering my reasons, I have considered and applied the Chairperson’s Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.

ALLEGATIONS

[3]       The principal claimant had three children with her husband in Egypt. She first came to the US with that husband. The male claimant was born there in 2001.

[4]       The principal claimant divorced her husband in 2001 and then married a Christian man, who was a permanent resident of the US, but her permanent residency was refused in the US. Her family found out about her marriage to a Christian and swore to kill her for an act against Islam. She divorced her second husband in 2009.

[5]       She made a refugee claim in the US in 2008, but it was denied in 2011 and lived illegally in the US, until she came to Canada.

[6]       She had the female child claimant with another man outside of marriage in 2010. Her family in Egypt learned to the child born outside marriage and threatened her with death for another offence against Islam.

[7]       Fearing deportation, the principal claimant came to Canada with her US daughter and made a refugee claim in 2017. The US male child claimant came into Canada later and made a refugee claim.

DETERMINATION

[8]       I find that the principal claimant is a “Convention refugee” as she established a serious possibility of persecution for religion and membership in a particular social group in Egypt as a woman victim of conjugal or family violence without adequate state protection in Egypt.

[9]       I find that the US associate claimants have not satisfied the burden of establishing a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or that, on a balance of probabilities, they would personally be subjected to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture upon return to their country, the US.

ANALYSIS

US Child claimants

[10]     The principal claimant in her own basis of claim form (BOC) and those of her children did not indicate that her US children faced a risk of serious harm in the US.

[11]     Their most recent counsel of record stated in the hearing that he did not intend to make any submissions for the US child claimants, regarding the US, and the principal claimant testified that these claimants did not face a serious harm in the US.

[12]     In the National Documentation Package (NDP) for the US, dated March 29, 2019, does not indicate that the child claimants, in their particular circumstances, would face a risk of serious harm in the US, or that there is a serious possibility of persecution for the child claimants in the US, or that there is a probability of risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment for the child claimants there. I do not consider that the separation of the family is sufficient to be understood as a serious harm or persecution for the child claimants, in particular since the laws of nationality and the control of borders are laws of general application, and have not been shown to be contrary to international standards of justice. Also, the documentation package for the US does not indicate that the child claimants would not be protected, if they needed protection in the US, as US citizens.

Credibility – principal claimant

[13]     I found the principal claimant generally credible regarding the main elements of her claim and of the claim for her US children.

[14]     She submitted credible and probative evidence regarding her religion as a Muslim previously in Egypt, of her marriages and relationships with her previous husbands or partners, the fact that some of them were Christian, and the birth of her children, including her daughter who was born while her mother, the principal claimant, was not married (C-1 to C-10 and C-17 to C- 18).

[15]     She submitted country condition information for Egypt regarding the mistreatment of Christians and women without adequate state protection. (C-11 to C-16).

[16]     The NDP for Egypt, dated March 29, 2019 indicates that women face practical widespread legal, social and economic discrimination in Egypt and that domestic violence (that may be considered family violence) is widespread and considered socially acceptable in Egypt (NDP, tab 1.4, section 2.3 and tab 5.6) and state protection is often ineffective and police are reluctant to investigate cases of violence against women (NDP, tab 1.4, section 2.4 and tab 5.5).

[17]     While there may be no legal impediment to internal movement, for even single women in Egypt who relocate for a variety of reasons (NDP, tab 1.4, section 2.4 and tab 5.5), the claimant is also a woman who has demonstrated that she is not a fully practicing Muslim and would likely encounter hostility or violence in a new residential area in Egypt.

[18]     Regarding women’s choice not to wear the hijab in public in Egypt, the NDP mentions harassment against women not wearing the hijab in Egypt and the perception that they are not Muslim (NDP, tab 5.1). The claimant, who does not wear a hijab as Muslim, would encounter other problems compounded by the fact of her past relations with Christian men and her daughter born outside marriage.

[19]     The NDP indicates that there have been recent terrorist attacks against Christians, Christian institutions, churches, and that State protection for Christians and their institutions is inadequate (NDP, tabs 12.1, 12, 5, 12.8, 12.14 and 12.16). Consequently, the claimant as a perceived apostate or Christian would face an increased risk of violence.

[20]     While religious conversion from Islam to Christianity or leaving Islam is not technically illegal in Egypt, the State can bring criminal charges against persons for apostasy, apostasy is forbidden by the Sharia and the State can prosecute persons for apostasy under the penal code for “denigrating religions” (NDP, tab 1.7, section 5.4.1).

State Protection

[21]     I find that there is clear and convincing evidence before me that the state is unable or unwilling to provide the principal claimant in Egypt with adequate protection, for the reasons stated above.

Internal flight alternative

[22]     I have considered whether a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) exists for the principal claimant. On the evidence before me, I find that there is a serious possibility of persecution throughout Egypt for the principal claimant.

[22]     She has demonstrated in her testimony and evidence that she is not a practicing Muslim, has married Christian men and shows the will to continue this open behaviour as well as not wearing the hijab and not willing to conceal or hide the fact that she has married Christians and had a child outside marriage. Consequently, I conclude that if she were not targeted by her immediate family, that she would have serious difficulty from orthodox Muslims and would have serious problems as a single woman to be able to live on her own in an IFA.

CONCLUSION

[24]     Based on the analysis above, I conclude that the principal claimant is a “Convention refugee” and I accept her claim.

[25]     For the reasons above, I conclude that the US child claimants are not “Convention refugees” under section 96 of IRPA or “persons in need of protection” within the meaning of section 97 (l)(a) or (b) of IRPA. Their claims are rejected.

(signed)           Jeffrey Brian Gullickson

August 2, 2019