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2020 RLLR 89

Citation: 2020 RLLR 89
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: December 10, 2020
Panel: Chad Prowse
Counsel for the Claimant(s): Kay Scorer
Country: Afghanistan
RPD Number: VB9-08564
Associated RPD Number(s):
ATIP Number: A-2021-00945
ATIP Pages: 000001-000008

REASONS FOR DECISION

INTRODUCTION

[1]       These are the reasons for the decision in the claim of [XXX] who claims to be a citizen of Afghanistan, and is claiming refugee protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).[1]

ALLEGATIONS

[2]       The claimant identifies his ethnicity as Hazara and his religion as Shia.

[3]       He worked as an [XXX] and [XXX] in Afghanistan on many [XXX] projects for the [XXX].

[4]       He and/or his relatives were threatened by anti-government elements (AGEs) including members of the Taliban on multiple occasions due to his employment. He was also attacked by the Taliban in [XXX] 2013, in Ghazni Province, and he was shot at in Kabul in [XXX] 2019.

[5]       These threats and assaults all took place in Ghazni province, the claimant’s family’s place of origin in Afghanistan, with the exception of the attack in Kabul in [XXX] 2019.

[6]       The claimant knows persons in his situation and/or with his profile who have been killed by the Taliban. He identifies them in his narrative.

[7]       The claimant left Afghanistan and traveled to Canada on a visitor visa in [XXX] 2019.

[8]       The claimant is afraid that he will be killed or harmed by AGEs because of his employment and profession.

DETERMINATION

[9] I find that the claimant is a Convention refugee as he has established a serious possibility of persecution on account of his race, religion and political opinion for the following reasons.

ANALYSIS

[10]     The determinative issue in this case is credibility.

Identity

[11]     I find that the claimant’s identity as a national of Afghanistan is established by the documents provided: passport; national identity card.[2]

Credibility

[12]     The claimant testified in a straightforward manner and there were no material contradictions, inconsistencies, or omissions in his testimony. He provided detailed and spontaneous testimony about his employment history as a [XXX] for [XXX].

[13]     Based on the documents in the file, I have noted no serious credibility issues. In particular, the following evidence helps to establish the allegations as set out above: employment agreements and contracts; copies of employment identification cards; education documents. After reviewing the documents, I have no reason to doubt their authenticity.

[14]     I do not draw any significant negative inference from the fact that the claimant failed to claim asylum in [XXX] or Canada in 2018, or [XXX] in 2019, and the fact that he did not leave Afghanistan until [XXX] 2019 notwithstanding his valid Canadian visitor visa. Firstly, I accept the claimant’s testimony that he believed that he was relatively safe in Kabul from the threats in his home province, providing he took basic precautions, which I accept that he did. He realized that this assumption was erroneous when he was attacked in Kabul in 2019. He did not delay in leaving Afghanistan after this incident. Secondly, the claimant was motivated to return to Afghanistan despite some level of risk, after completing his Master’s degree in [XXX] which he believed would increase his capacity to help his country. Thirdly, his trip to [XXX] took place before the attack in Kabul, and its purpose was to seek medical treatment for family members. Overall, I find that these considerations do not undermine the claimant’s credibility or his subjective fear of persecution in Afghanistan.

Well-founded fear of persecution

[15]     The available country evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP)[3] establishes that there is an objective basis for the claimant’s fear, and that he falls under numerous intersecting risk profiles, contributing to his overall situation of risk.

[16]     According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Eligibility Guidelines for Afghanistan,

[17]     AGEs [anti-government elements] are reported to systematically target civilians who are associated with, or who are perceived to be supporting the Afghan Government, pro­-Government armed groups, Afghan civil society and the international community in Afghanistan, including the international military forces and international humanitarian and development actors. The (perceived) association with any of these actors may arise for example through current or former employment or family ties. Civilians who have been targeted include district and provincial governors, judicial and prosecution staff, former and off-duty police officers, tribal elders, religious scholars and leaders, women in the public sphere, teachers and other civilian government workers, civilians perceived to oppose AGE values, human rights activists, and humanitarian and development aid workers. Between 1 January and 31 December 2017, UNAMA attributed 570 targeted killings to AGEs, which caused 1,032 civilian casualties (650 deaths and 382 injured) and accounted for 10 percent of all civilian casualties during the year. The number of such incidents perpetrated by AGEs increased from 483 in 2016 to 570 in 2017, and the number of civilians killed in such incidents increased by 13 per cent.[4]

[18]     According to the EASO report on “Afghanistan Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict”.

[19]     In 2016, UNAMA recorded 481 incidents targeting government officials, including judges, prosecutors and judicial staff but not including ANSF, resulting in 521 casualties. For example, in 2016 in Kandahar City, there was a continued spree of execution style killings of civilians working for or perceived as having connections with, the local authorities… [However] [t]argeting by the Taliban is not limited to those who are government employees, but also to those who are accused of being a supporter of the government. In 2013, UNAMA documented 246 attacks against civilians who had no official affiliation to government, NGOs or recognised civilian institutions (i.e. medical, education, elections, development programming). These attacks against civilians resulted in 532 civilian casualties… Through their parallel judicial system, the Taliban also punished those they accused of being a spy, and passing on information on the Taliban to the government. According to Giustozzi, spying for the government is considered a crime per se, without the possibility to repent.[5]

The UNHCR also reports that,

There are reports of individuals who returned from Western countries having been threatened, tortured or killed by AGEs on the grounds that they were perceived to have adopted values associated with these countries, or they had become “foreigners” or that they were spies for or supported a Western country. Returnees are reportedly often treated with suspicion by the local community as well as by State officials, leading to discrimination and isolation. Individuals who fall under other profiles, such as profile 1.e (humanitarian workers and development workers) and profile 1.e (women in the public sphere) may similarly be accused by AGEs for having adopted values and/or appearances associated with Western countries, and may be targeted for that reason.[6]

[20]     The claimant is also a member of a minority ethnic or religious group in Afghanistan, having self-identified his ethnicity as Hazara. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines, ethnicity and religion in Afghanistan are inextricably linked, especially in the case of Hazaras.[7] The objective evidence shows that Hazaras suffer discrimination and are victims of violent attacks by AGEs. A Response to Information Request (RIR) from the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) states that “the position of Hazaras as an overwhelmingly Shiite non-Pushtun minority makes them an easy target for the overwhelmingly-Pushtun Taliban seeking to rebuild support from Sunni Pushtun groups…”[8]

[21]     On a balance of probabilities, I accept that the claimant worked as a [XXX] for [XXX] in Afghanistan; that this information came to the attention of the Taliban, initially in Ghazni province; and that he is a member of a minority ethnic or religious group in Afghanistan, that is targeted by AGEs merely on the basis of race or religion. The country evidence establishes that the claimant faces a well-founded fear of persecution.

State Protection

[22]     While states are presumed to be capable of protecting their nationals, it was open to the claimant, according to the law, to rebut the presumption of protection with “clear and convincing” evidence.[9]

[23]     The evidence in the National Documentation Package shows that while state authorities in Kabul and other cities controlled by the government may be willing to offer protection, in general that protection is unlikely to be effective or adequate.

[24]     Additionally, according to the U.S. Department of State, corruption in the police and justice system is pervasive.

[25]     I find, on the evidence, that the claimant has rebutted the presumption of state protection.

Internal Flight Alternative

[26]     I have considered whether a viable internal flight alternative exists for the claimant. On the evidence before me, I find that there is a serious possibility of persecution throughout Afghanistan.

[27]     The available country information establishes that with respect to state protection, the central government is generally strongest in Kabul and possibly a few other big cities such as

Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.[10]

[28]     However, the preceding analysis has shown that even in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, state protection is ineffective and inadequate for persons in the claimants’ situation.

[29]     Additionally, there is evidence that the Taliban are able to find a person who relocates to a different area, particularly when targeting their “well known or well positioned opponents.”

[ 30]    Also, the Taliban generally has the capability to track individuals, through the use of “formal and informal communication” networks to obtain information about a person’s whereabouts. While it is more difficult to track people who have moved into urban environments, even there the Taliban have spies and members who can gather considerable

information.[11]

CONCLUSION

[31]     Based on the analysis above, I conclude that the claimant is a Convention refugee. Accordingly, I accept his claim.


[1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.

[2] Exhibit 1.

[3] Exhibit 3.

[4] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.5: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 30 August 2018.

[5] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.18: EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Afghanistan: Individuals targeted by armed actors in the conflict. European Union. European Asylum Support Office. December 2017.

[6] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.5: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 30 August 2018.

[7] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.5: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 30 August 2018.

[8] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 13.2: DFAT Thematic Report: Hazaras In Afghanistan. Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 18 September 2017.

[9] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.21: ? Afghanistan. The precarious struggle for stability. Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. May 2019.

[10] Exhibit National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 1.6: Country Policy and Information Note. Afghanistan: Afghans perceived as “Westernised”. Version 1.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. January 2018.

[11] Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Afghanistan, 31 March 2020, tab 14.1: Whether the Taliban has the capacity to pursue individuals after they relocate to another region; their capacity to track individuals over the long term; Taliban capacity to carry out targeted killings (2012-January 2016). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 15 February 2016. AFG105412.E.