2022 RLLR 136

Citation: 2022 RLLR 136
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: January 18, 2022
Panel: Cristina De Leon
Counsel for the Claimant(s): David P. Yerzy
Country: Russia and Armenia
RPD Number: TB9-27796
Associated RPD Number(s): TB9-27868, TB9-27887
ATIP Number: A-2023-01023
ATIP Pages: N/A

 

REASONS FOR DECISION

 

[1]       This is a decision in the claims for refugee protection made by the principal claimant XXXX and the associate claimants, his wife XXXX and their daughter XXXX in RPD file numbers TB9-27796, TB9-27868 and TB9-27887. The principal claimant and the associate claimant AG are citizens of Russia and Armenia. The associate claimant AA is a citizen of Russia and has a right to citizenship to Armenia, having been born of parents of Armenian citizenship. The claimants seek refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).[1]

 

[2]       Pursuant to section 167.2 of the IRPA, the claimant AG was appointed as the designated representative of the minor claimant AA.

 

[3]       I heard the claims jointly pursuant to Refugee Protection Division Rule 55.

 

ALLEGATIONS

 

[4]       The facts and circumstances alleged in support of the claims are set out in the claimants’ Basis of Claim (BOC) forms.[2] In summary, the claimants fear harm and persecution in Russia from the Russian government and in particular, the FSB, due to the principal claimant’s anti­ government political opinion and activism. The claimants also fear harm and persecution in Armenia because the Armenian government cooperates with the Russian government and will also persecute and harm them due to the principal claimant’ s opposition to the Russian government.

 

DETERMINATION

 

[5]       I have determined that the claimants are Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA.

 

ANALYSIS

 

[6]       In making this assessment, I considered all the evidence including the oral testimonies and the documentary evidence.

 

NEXUS

 

[7]       I find that the principal claimant’ s claims against Russia and Armenia have a nexus to the Convention based on his political opinion against the Russian government. The political opinion nexus of his claim against Russia also intersects with the nexus of the principal claimant’ s race or ethnicity, as an Armenian. I find that the associate claimants’ claims against Russia and Armenia have a nexus to the Convention based on their membership in a particular social group, being members of the family of a political dissident.

 

IDENTITY

 

[8]       The claimants’ identities were established on a balance of probabilities by certified true copies of their Russia-issued passports.[3]

 

CREDIBILITY – Claim Against Russia

 

[9]       The principal claimant and the associate claimant, AG, testified at the hearing in a detailed, spontaneous and forthright manner. The principal claimant testified with detailed knowledge about the political situation in Russia, the history and objectives of the opposition party, Republican Party of Russia- People’s Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS) (hereinafter

“PARNAS”) and described with particularity various political events and his participation. He described the alleged events of persecution in an internally consistent manner and in a manner consistent with the documentary evidence. He was able to explain an inconsistency between the Basis of Claim narrative and the medical report pertaining to how he arrived at the hospital on XXXX 2015, whether he drove himself as stated in the narrative or taken by ambulance as

stated in the report. He testified that he started to drive himself to the hospital but soon realized he could not be driving due to his injuries; he stopped driving and called an ambulance which took him to the hospital. I find that the explanation reconciles the two (2) statements; I accept the explanation as reasonable. I find that the principal claimant and the associate claimant AG to be credible witnesses, and believe what they have alleged in support of their claims.

 

[10]     The claimants also submitted documentary evidence which corroborate material aspects of their claim. These include the PARNAS Party Registration documents in XXXX[4] letter from PARNAS party confirming the principal claimant’ s active membership since XXXX 2012,[5]  photos of the principal claimant in protests,[6] April 26, 2016 Russian police summons,[7] letter from XXXX confirming the principal claimant’s active participation in also confirming the principal claimant’s active participation in PARNAS,[8] letter from XXXX also confirming the principal claimant’s active participation in PARNAS,[9] medical report confirming principal claimant’s XXXX and XXXX 2015,[10] and medical report confirming principal claimant’s injuries sustained on June 9, 2019.[11] I have no reason to doubt the veracity and reliability of these documents and as such place great weight on them in support of the claimants’ allegations.

 

[11]     Considering the credible testimonies and reliable documentary evidence, I make the following factual findings, based on a balance of probabilities:

    1. The principal claimant was an active member of PARNAS, having joined the party in XXXX 2012. His political activism grew out of his experiences as a person of Armenian origin, a visible minority in Russia, subjected to name-calling and rude comments from Russian society and constant harassment, unjustified police checks and extortion by Russian police. The indignities he suffered, spurred a desire to be treated equally and respectfully by society and authorities, and led to his political activism.
    2. The principal claimant is XXXX the PARNAS party, which finally achieved its certification in 2016 after overcoming 4 years of bureaucratic obstacles. Between 2015 and 2019, he attended various party meetings, rallies, strikes and protests against government corruption, in support of patriots, against pension reform, in memory of slain PARNAS co-chair and prominent opposition figure Boris Nemstov and to demand the resignation of President Putin, Prime Minister Medvedev and the Rostov Governor. XXXX. He was effective in bringing more people to meetings because he had a common language with these people. He was also responsible for finding venues (often at orchards or parks because the local government did not rent spaces to them) and preparing posters for these events. He also XXXX. When the government banned political gatherings, he staged a one-man picket on XXXX 2019 in support of jailed investigative journalist XXXX and ethnic Armenia journalist XXXX.
    3. In the evening XXXX 2015, the principal claimant was at a local tram station when three (3) men with short haircuts and strong physiques and who looked like they were military, FSB or police, approached and attacked him. As they beat him up, they told him to stop working for the PARNAS party and to stop opposing the government or “you will end up like XXXX. The men also called him “black ass” and told him he should go back to his country. The principal claimant suffered massive trauma and had to undergo XXXX. He reported the incident as a politically motivated attack to the police who attended the hospital. He was told that the Transportation Police would contact him, as the incident occurred at the tram station. After repeated follow-up visits, the Transportation Police sent him a notice to appear for interrogation. At the interrogation on April 28, 2016, the officers were negative toward him, and told him they had information that he was a political agitator, and that he must have provoked or started the incident. They also told him that he would cease to have problems if he stopped his political activities. The police refused to register a complaint on his behalf.
    4. The principal claimant spent five (5) months in the US from XXXX 2016 to XXXX 2016 during which he took a break from the stress he experienced in Russia and recovered his health. Asked why he did not claim asylum in the US at that time, the principal claimant explained that he did not want to stop his political activities at that time. He wanted to keep fighting for a better future.
    5. On XXXX 2019, after his one-man picket in the center of the city against the imprisonment of journalists IG and GA, he was heading home when three (3) men with short hair and well-built physiques and who appeared to be military or police, approached and started hitting and beating him. They told him to stop his political activities. They told him that this was his final warning or next time, they would kill him. He suffered a XXXX for which he received medical treatment. At the hospital, he told the police the attack was politically motivated. The police told him everything would be fine once he stopped his political activities. Asked why he was harmed while XXXX had not been harmed, the principal claimant replied “because I’m a non-Russian” and suggested there would be no investigation or punishment for the perpetrators.
    6. Fearful for his safety, the principal claimant left Russia and went to Armenia on XXXX 2019. The associate claimants also feared harm and joined him in Armenia on XXXX 2019.
    7. The principal claimant and his daughter, the associate claimant, AA, returned to Russia on XXXX 2019 until XXXX 2019 to allow AA to say goodbye to her friends and obtain her school certificate. XXXX because of the XXXX 2019 attack on the principal claimant; she had seen a psychologist in Russia and another psychologist in Armenia who advised that the abandonment of her friends was making her situation worse. Asked why he returned to Russia, if he feared harm to himself, he explained that AA wanted her father, the principal claimant, to be the one to accompany her on her final trip to Russia. He explained that during their brief 8-day stay in Russia, he did not connect with anyone, did not advise any one from the party about his presence in the country and did not engage in any political activity. They also stayed in a relative’s house. Considering that the well-being of his daughter underpinned his decision to return to Russia for the brief visit and considering the safety precautions he took, I do not draw a negative inference from the principal claimant’s apparent re­availment.
    8. The claimants did not intend to stay in Armenia and came to Canada on XXXX, 2019.
    9. The principal claimant fears persecution by the Russian government and its agents, the FSB (Federal Security Bureau) and the Russian police, due to his political opposition to the government and asserts he is especially a target because of his Armenian ethnicity. The associate claimants fear harm and persecution to themselves as members of the principal claimant’s family, indicating that the Russian government has tried to take the children of political dissidents.

SUBJECTIVE FEAR – Russia

 

[12]     I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the principal claimant has established a subjective fear that he would be persecuted and killed if he were to return to Russia due to his political activism, and that he is especially a target because of his Armenian ethnicity. The associate claimants have established a subjective fear of persecution as family members of a political activist.

 

OBJECTIVE BASIS – Russia

 

[13]     The National Documentation Package for Russia (NDP), in a report entitled “The Kremlin’s Political Prisoners: Advancing a Political Agenda by Crushing Dissent”, indicates that “[s]ince [Putin] first became President in 2000, and especially since his formal return to the Kremlin in 2012, the Kremlin has engaged in a wide-ranging crackdown on civil society, political opponents, critical voices, unpopular minorities, and anyone else it views unfavorably or as a threat” and that “this persecution is only increasing”.[12] The evidence states that political opponents, civil society activists, and journalists are at particular risk and in an effort to sow fear and discourage dissent, prosecutors are bringing baseless treason and espionage charges, casting political opponents as “enemies of the state.”

 

[14]     The objective evidence describes Kremlin’s “unprecedented crackdown” on civil society, dissenting voices, and regime opponents, which has continued unabated since 2012[13]. The list of targets includes not just opposition candidates, but also anyone who supports them or dares to criticize those in power. Even being associated with opposition leaders, however indirectly, can lead to arrest or imprisonment. Freedom House, for example, recently noted: “Opposition politicians and activists are frequently targeted with fabricated criminal cases and other forms of administrative harassment apparently designed to prevent their participation in the political process.” Amnesty International has similarly reported that “protest leaders and political activists supporting critical voices faced harassment, administrative and criminal proceedings and physical violence.”[14]

 

[15]     The evidence indicates that authorities detained and prosecuted individuals for political reasons. Charges usually applied in politically motivated cases included “terrorism,” “extremism,” “separatism,” and “espionage.” Political prisoners were reportedly placed in particularly harsh conditions of confinement and subjected to other punitive treatment within the prison system, such as solitary confinement or punitive stays in psychiatric unit.[15]

 

[16]     The United States. Department of State (DOS), Russia. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020 cites reports that police beat or otherwise abused persons, in some cases resulting in their death. For example, media reported that members of Russia’s National Guard forcibly dispersed a peaceful political rally in Khabarovsk City on October 12. Several participants reported being beaten by police during the rally’ s dispersal, at least one with a police baton; one victim suffered a broken nose. Two detained minors said they were “put on their knees in a corner, mocked, had their arms twisted, and were hit in the eye.”[16]

 

[17]     The news articles submitted by the claimant “Peaceful Protests Didn’t Produce Any Results: Three Russian Activists Who Left” (dated March 24, 2021)[17] and “Exile or Jail: The Grim Choice Facing Russian Opposition Leaders” (August 31, 2021)[18] chronicle the torrent of politically motivated emigration by Russian dissidents and activists as a result of the Russian government’s brutal repression and persecution.

 

[18]     The objective evidence also describes the targeting of visible minorities. While the law prohibits discrimination based on nationality, officials discriminated against minorities, including through “de facto racial profiling, targeting in particular migrants and persons from Central Asia and the Caucasus.” The evidence confirms the scenario described by the principal claimant, indicating that police officers often stopped individuals who looked foreign and asked them for their documents, claiming that they contained mistakes even when they were in order, and demanded bribes. The evidence indicates that hate crimes targeting ethnic minorities continued to be a problem. As of August 3 [2020], one individual had died and 14 had been injured in racially motivated attacks since the beginning of the year. On June 13, a 17-year-old medical student from Azerbaijan, died after being stabbed 20 times in Volgograd. Police later detained Vitaliy Vasilyev, an unemployed local man, who confessed to attacking Gavrilov on the basis of his ethnic identity. According to media reports, Vasilyev had ties to radical right-wing organizations and attacked the student because he wanted to “kill a non-Russian.”[19]

 

[19]     I find that there is objective basis for the principal claimant’s fear of persecution at the hands of government authorities due to his political activism, and that he is at increased risk of persecution and harm due to his Armenian ethnicity.

 

[20]     Regarding the risk of persecution faced by the associate claimants, the objective evidence indicates that there is a unified federal register containing information on all the country’s residents, including their names, dates and places of birth, and marital status; and that Russian intelligence and security services have access to the database in their investigations. The evidence cites reports that authorities threatened to remove children from the custody of parents engaged in political activism or some forms of religious worship, or parents who were LGBTI persons. For example, on October 2 [2020], Russian media reported that authorities were threatening to arrest and take away the children of gay men who have fathered their children through surrogacy, accusing them of child trafficking. Several families reportedly left the country due to fear of arrest.[20]

 

[21]     The news article “Peaceful Protests Protests Didn’t Produce Any Results: Three Russian Activists Who Left” (dated March 24, 2021)[21] quotes a political activist Yaroslav who was given asylum in the US:

Even in Russia, even now, you formally have the right to express your opinions, but they persecute you for that… They threaten to take away some people’ s children. Others are followed and not able to live normally. A student might get kicked out of his university. All of this is considered persecution.

 

[22]     A report entitled “Like Walking a Minefield”: Vicious Crackdown on Critics in Russia’s Chechen Republic[22] describes the unlawful detention and ill-treatment by police officials of a woman and her three (3) under-aged daughters in retaliation for her husband’s public remarks criticizing the authorities. The mother and the eldest daughter, age 17, were both beaten and threatened with death, with the objective of convincing them to persuade her husband to retract his comments. The mother was also subjected to a mock execution.

 

[23]     I find that there is objective basis for the associate claimant’s fear of persecution at the hands of government authorities as members of the family of a political activist.

 

Well-Founded Fear of Persecution – Russia

 

[24]     Considering the claimants’ subjective fear grounded on objective basis, I find on a balance of probabilities that the claimants have established a well- founded fear of persecution. Considering the principal claimant’ s genuine political convictions and zeal for activism to bring about change, coupled with the fact that he is a visible minority of Armenian ethnicity, he faces on a forward-looking basis, a serious risk of persecution, should he return to Russia. Considering the associate claimants’ membership in the principal claimant’s immediate family, they face, on a forward-looking basis, a serious risk of persecution, should they return to Russia.

 

State Protection – Russia

 

[25]     The agent of persecution is the state itself which has engaged in a wide-ranging crackdown on critical voices and unpopular minorities, and anyone else it views unfavorably or as a threat. The United States Department of State (DOS), Russia. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020,[23] cites a long list of significant human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings and attempted extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearances; pervasive torture by government law enforcement officers that sometimes resulted in death and occasionally involved sexual violence or punitive psychiatric incarceration; harsh and life­ threatening conditions in prisons; arbitrary arrest and detention; political and religious prisoners and detainees; severe suppression of freedom of expression and media, including the use of “anti-extremism” and other laws to prosecute peaceful dissent and religious minorities; severe suppression of the right of peaceful assembly; severe suppression of freedom of association. The report states that the government has failed to take adequate steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, or punish most officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity.

The claimants will not be able to avail themselves of the protection of authorities in Russia. The presumption that the claimants will be able to receive adequate state protection in Russia is contradicted by the country conditions evidence.

 

Internal Flight Alternative – Russia

 

[26]     The Russian government’ s vicious campaign to crush dissent and to silence critics, exists throughout the Russian Federation, including Chechnya and Russia-occupied Crimea as described in the objective evidence.[24] The Kremlin has undertaken legal reform that has enabled it to target and punish its opponents more effectively. The Russian government has created new crimes and offenses and broadened existing ones, all of which have effectivity and enforceability nationwide. There is no internal flight alternative available to the claimants throughout Russian.

 

CREDIBILITY – Claim Against Armenia

 

[27]     The principal claimant testified that the government in Armenia is pro-Russia. He described the cooperation between the Russian FSB and the Armenian security forces and testified that under an agreement between Russia and Armenia, Russian border guards do the work of guarding the Armenian border. The principal claimant testified that the Armenian government cannot oppose the will of the Russian government and can have him arrested and put in jail under false charges in Armenia.

 

[28]     The principal claimant testified that on XXXX 2019, the Armenian police came to the house of his mother and brother in Armenia; both his mother and brother were not home at the time. The police left a document with a neighbour. The document entitled “Summons -Call for Questioning” required the principal claimant to be present for questioning on XXXX 2019 in

connection with the investigation of a criminal case. The claimant’s brother, XXXX (AA), attended the police station on XXXX 2019 and advised the police that the principal claimant left Armenia. A man who was not in police uniform identified himself as a member of the Armenian National Security Service (NSS) and told AA that FSB had contacted the NSS and informed them that the principal claimant was an “enemy of Russia” and a “political troublemaker”. He told AA to tell the principal claimant he cannot engage in activities against Russia from inside Armenia and that he should not return to Armenia as enemies of Russia were not welcome in Armenia. After the incident, the Armenian authorities contacted AA two (2) more times, in XXXX 2020 and in XXXX 2021, asking if there was any information about the principal claimant’s whereabouts.

 

[29]     I have considered the principal claimant’ s detailed evidence, corroborated by a copy of the Summons dated XXXX 2019, issued by the Republic of Armenia Special Investigation Services of the Investigations Central Administrative Department[25] and a letter signed by his brother, AA, confirming the claimant’s testimony.[26] I find on a balance of probabilities that the Armenian government has sought the principal claimant as an “enemy of Russia” and a “political agitator”.

 

[30]     The claimants do not feel safe in Armenia and fear that the Armenian government will do the will of the Russian government and subject them to the same persecution they sought to escape in Russia.

 

SUBJECTIVE FEAR – Armenia

 

[31]     I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the principal claimant has established a subjective fear that he would be persecuted by Armenian authorities at the behest of the Russian government if he were to return to Armenia due to his political activism. The associate claimants have established a subjective fear of persecution as family members of an individual deemed an “enemy of Russia” and a “political agitator”.

 

OBJECTIVE BASIS – Armenia

 

[32]     The BTI 2020 Country Report for Armenia indicates that in economic and security terms, Armenia is overly reliant on its ally, Russia, which also controls most of the country’s strategic assets, including the entire gas distribution network, railroads and telecommunications and enjoys a near-monopoly on the gas market.[27]

 

[33]     The BTI 2020 Country Report for Armenia describes a crucial event in 2013 when Armenia made a sudden U-turn, away from a long-negotiated Association Agreement with the EU and announced its intention to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).[28] The move is widely believed to be the result of strong Russian pressure in the areas of economy, energy and security.[29]

 

[34]     The BTI 2020 Country Report for Russia explains Russia’ s motive for creation of the EEU. It indicates that since Russia wants to be a global power, Moscow is interested in some cooperation and therefore created the Eurasian Economic Union with four former Soviet republics (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), which facilitates Russia’s exertion of regional influence.[30] The report also refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed after the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, which promotes cooperation in economics, military, and political aspects and coordination of trade, finance, lawmaking, and security among its member states, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The report states that “Russia treats the CIS region as its sphere of influence and reacts to conflicts that might threaten its own security with increasing assertiveness” and that “[s]ome CIS countries, like Kazakhstan, Belarus or Armenia, have accepted Russian dominance in return for preferential economic treatment and security guarantees.“[31]

 

[35]     A Eurasian Daily Monitor news article “Armenian Prime Minister Pashinian Wins New Political Mandate” dated July 1, 2021,[32] submitted by the claimant about the re-election of Nikol Pashnian as Armenian Prime Minister reflects the close, cooperative and interdependent relationship between Armenia and Russia. It reports:

…On May 27, Pashnian’s cabinet allocated several land plots in the country’s southernmost region of Syunik in order to establish border service posts under the supervision of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB); and already after the elections, Yerevan dispatched a delegation to Moscow in order to discuss a planned expansion of the Russian military base on Armenian soil. New Russian troops will likely be stationed in the Gegharkunik region, bordering Kelbajar, which was returned to Azerbaijan’s control as a result of the war. The Pashinian government has also made other post-war concessions to Moscow. Most importantly, an inter-governmental agreement circumventing the law on audiovisual media, adopted earlier in 2020, allows state­ controlled Russian TV companies to keep their slots on the Armenia airwaves.

 

[36]     A report entitled “Armenia – Relations with Russia” by Global.Security.org[33] describes the interdependency between Armenia and Russia:

Russia counts on Armenia to be its ally in the Caucasus. Armenia recognizes its reliance

— even dependence — on Russia’s continued support on security and trade issues and will remain a loyal supporter of Russian policies where it counts. Russia can rely on continued Armenian support for its military presence and for the majority of its positions in international fora such as the OSCE. Armenia can count on Russia for its role as mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Complementarity remains the watchword of Armenian foreign policy, but when push comes to shove, Russia remains Armenia’s key ally.

 

Russia has a closer relationship with Armenia than with any other country in the South Caucasus. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia’s national security continued to depend heavily on the Russian military. The officer corps of the new national army created in 1992 included many Armenian former officers of the Soviet army, and Russian institutes trained new Armenian officers. Two Russian divisions were transferred to Armenian control, but another division remained under full Russian control on Armenian soil.

 

The Russian military presence in Armenia is a major component of Armenian security. The Russian 102nd Military Base, headquartered in Gyumri, dated from Soviet times and was intended to defend against the Turkish Third Field Army, which … is still considered a significant security threat to Armenia. The Turkish Third Army was not subject to CFE inspections. These forces and the Turkish support to Azerbaijani military forces stationed in Nakhichevan posed the greatest security threat to Armenia because they could easily cut Armenia into two

 

[37]     The Danish Immigration Service Fact Finding Mission to Yerevan, Armenia in its compilation entitled “Armenia State Actors, Political Situation, Vulnerable Groups and Citizenship Report”[34] indicates that anyone could arbitrarily be subject to persecution by Armenian police and other state actors. According to Civil Society Institute, it depends on numerous factors including, among others, whether the person is able to inspire others to join protests, the cause of the protests (especially anti-Russian protests trigger the authorities), and whether or not there is a specific instruction of the superior authorities. According to the Helsinki Association, political activists, human rights defenders, and journalists are somehow permanently targeted by the authorities, especially when they criticise the authorities and the ruling elite.

 

[38]     The report entitled “Russia. Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression”[35] documents the Russian government’s highly aggressive transnational repression activities beyond the boundaries of Russia:

The Russian government conducts highly aggressive transnational repression activities abroad. Its campaign, which heavily relies on assassination as a tool, targets former insiders and others who are perceived as threats to the regime’s security. The government pairs this campaign with control over key cultural institutions operating abroad, in an effort to exert influence over the Russian diaspora.

 

The Russian campaign accounts for 7 of 26 assassinations or assassination attempts since 2014, as catalogued in Freedom House’s global survey. It is also responsible for assaults, detentions, unlawful deportations, and renditions in eight countries, mostly in Europe. Of the 32 documented physical cases of Russian transnational repression, a remarkable 20 have a Chechen nexus. The Kremlin Since coming to power in 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin has engaged in an ongoing subversion campaign in Europe and the United States, using tactics short of war.

 

As part of this “political warfare,” the Putin government frequently builds influence networks through corrupt and corrupting means, disseminates disinformation, builds alliances with antiliberal parties and political actors, and conducts hacking operations. The government does all this while resisting and avoiding attribution, unlike in overt and clearly attributed public diplomacy efforts or soft-power efforts that rely on persuasion and attraction.

 

The Kremlin’ s approach to transnational repression extends naturally from this “political warfare” concept. When selecting individual targets, the Kremlin focuses its efforts on those who may have defected to NATO member states and cooperate with their intelligence agencies, those who were considered to have previously engaged in armed conflict against Russia, or those who have run afoul of security services through business or political activities.

 

[39]     The Washington Post news article “The long-terrifying history of Russian dissidents being poisoned abroad” dated June 3, 2018 documents the systematic and ruthless killings carried out by Russia outside its borders, abroad, targeting those seen as betraying its interest. The cases cited include the poisoning of Sergie Skripal, a former Russian spy, and his daughter, Yulia.

 

[40]     I find that the objective evidence establishes the close, cooperative and interdependent relationship between Armenia and Russia, as well as Russia’s highly aggressive transnational repression activities, against political dissidents and those deemed “enemies of the state” and as in the case of Yulia Skripal, including their families. I find on a balance of probabilities that there is objective basis for the claimants’ fear that the long arm of Russia’s persecution against political dissidents and their families, will reach them in Armenia and that they are not safe in Armenia.

 

Well-Founded Fear of Persecution -Armenia

 

[41]     Considering the claimants’ subjective fear and the objective basis, I find on a balance of probabilities that the claimants have established a well-founded fear of persecution, that should they return to Armenia, the Armenian authorities will cooperate with Russia and persecute and harm them, due to the principal claimant’s political opinion.

 

State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative – Armenia

 

[42]     Given the objective evidence regarding Armenia’ s close cooperation and coordination with Russia with regard to political aspects and security matters, as described, I find on a balance of probabilities that the Armenian state will not be able to provide adequate state protection to the claimants. I am satisfied based on the objective evidence that the presumption of state protection is rebutted. Given Russia’ s acceptance of Russia’ s dominance and sphere of influence within Armenia, as described by the objective evidence, I also find that there is no safe or viable internal flight alternative for the claimants anywhere in Armenia.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[43]     I conclude that the principal claimant faces a serious possibility of persecution in Russia based on the Convention grounds of political opinion and race or ethnicity; and in Armenia based on the Convention ground of political opinion. I also conclude that the associate claimants face a serious possibility of persecution in Russia and Armenia based on a Convention ground, namely membership in a particular social group, as members of the family of a political dissident. The claims for refugee protection are accepted

 

(signed) Cristina De Leon

 

January 18, 2022

 

 

 

[1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, sections 96 and 97 (1).

 

[2] Exhibits 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

 

[3] Exhibit 1.

 

[4] Exhibit 7, pages 2-7.

 

[5] Exhibit 7, pages 8-10.

 

[6] Exhibit 7, pages 11-13.

 

[7] Exhibit 7, pages 14-16.

 

[8] Exhibit 7, pages 20-25.

 

[9] Exhibit 7, pages 26-30.

 

[10] Exhibit 7, pages 41-45.

 

[11] Exhibit 7, pages 46-49.

 

[12] Exhibit 3.1, Item 4.5 at page 8.

 

[13] Exhibit 3.1, Item 4.5 at page 16.

 

[14] Exhibit 3.1, Item 4.5 at page 25.

 

[15] Exhibit 3.1, Item 4.5 at page 17.

 

[16] Exhibit 3.1, Item 4.5 at page 7.

 

[17] Exhibit 8, pages 27-32.

 

[18] Exhibit 8, at pages 33-39.

 

[19] Exhibit 3.1, Item 2.1 at pages 59-60.

 

[20] Exhibit 3.1, Item 2.1 at page 21.

 

[21] Exhibit 8, pages 27-32.

 

[22] Exhibit 3.1, Items 4.6 at pages 24-25, 35-40.

 

[23] Exhibit 3.1, Items 2.1 at page 2.

 

[24] Exhibit 3.1, Items 4.5 at page 8.

 

[25] Exhibit 7, pages 17-18.

 

[26] Exhibit 7, pages 31-34.

 

[27] Exhibit 3.2, Item 1.5 at page 24.

 

[28] Exhibit 3.2, Item 1.5 at pages 31-32.

 

[29] Exhibit 3.2, Item 4.1 at page 3.

 

[30] Exhibit 3.1, Item 1.6 at pages 38-39.

 

[31] Exhibit 3.1, Item 1.6 at pages 38-39.

 

[32] Exhibit 8, pages 45-47.

 

[33] Armenia – Relations with Russia (globalsecurity.org)

 

[34] Exhibit 3.2, Item 1.4 at page 30.

 

[35] Exhibit 3.1, Item 2.17 at page 1.