2023 RLLR 260
Citation: 2023 RLLR 260
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: December 12, 2023
Panel: Stefan Martens
Counsel for the Claimant(s): N/A
Country: Lebanon
RPD Number: VC3-04633
Associated RPD Number(s): VC3-04634, VC3-04635, VC3-04636
ATIP Number: A-2024-01360
ATIP Pages: N/A
DECISION
[1] These are the reasons for the decision in the claim of XXXX XXXX (principal claimant, or PC), XXXX XXXX XXXX (associate claimant, or AC), XXXX XXXX (also known as XXXX XXXX, minor claimant #1, or MC#1) and XXXX XXXX (minor claimant #2, or MC#2), who claim to be stateless Palestinians who are claiming refugee protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).[1]
[2] The PC was named the designated representative for the two minor claimants (his daughters) pursuant to subsection 167(2) of the IRPA and rule 20 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules.
DETERMINATION
[3] I find that the claimants are Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA.
ALLEGATIONS
[4] The PC’s Basis of Claim form[2] narrative and testimony contain the bulk of the claimants’ allegations. In short, the claimants fear returning to Lebanon because of pervasive and systemic discrimination that leaves them unable to eke out a living.
[5] The claimants are a family of four stateless Palestinians. The PC is a United Arab Emirates-born man who is 36 years old. Claiming with him are his 31-year-old, Libya-born wife (AC); their 5-year-old Lebanon-born daughter (MC#1) and their 4-year-old Oman-born daughter (MC#2).
[6] The PC was 2 years old when his Palestinian family moved from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) back to Lebanon, where they had fled in the Nakba in 1948. From 1990 until 2011, he lived in Lebanon. From 2011 until 2014, he worked as an XXXX in Mauritania before returning to Lebanon.
[7] The AC, meanwhile, was born in 1992 in Libya to Palestinian parents, who had moved from Lebanon to Libya for work. When she was 8, her family moved from Libya back to Lebanon, where she lived from 2000 until 2018.
[8] In 2015, the PC moved to Oman for work. During a break, he returned to Lebanon and married the AC in 2017.
[9] In 2018, the adult claimants and the MC#1 moved to Oman, where the second daughter was born.
[10] On XXXX XXXX, 2022, the PC lost his job in Oman, forcing all the claimants to return to Lebanon. But because the PC could not find work in Lebanon, the claimants fled to the United States in XXXX 2022 before crossing into Canada, where the PC’s aunt lives, to claim protection.
ANALYSIS
Identity
[11] The claimants’ personal identities are established by their sworn testimony and the certified copies of their Lebanese-issued Travel Documents for Palestinian Refugees.[3]
Countries of Reference
[12] I do not find that the claimants have any countries of reference.
[13] The claimants were born in four different countries: the UAE (PC), Libya (AC), Lebanon (MC#1) and Oman (MC#2). The adult claimants, meanwhile, have spent a majority of their lives in Lebanon. As such, I considered whether the claimants had a right to citizenship in any of these countries.
Lebanon
[14] I do not find that any of the claimants have a right to Lebanese citizenship either by right of birth (in the case of the MC#1) or by naturalization (in the case of the other claimants).
[15] Both sets of adult claimants’ parents are Palestinians who were residing in refugee camps in Lebanon after their family fled Palestine in 1948.
[16] But according to a Response to Information Request (RIR) that quoted the director of the Lebanese Emigration Research Center (LERC) at Notre Dame University, “[i]t is practically impossible for anyone who is not born to a Lebanese male to obtain Lebanese citizenship. Citizenship is acquired through paternal jus sanguini and jus soli.[4]
[17] The LERC director added that foreigners have only ever obtained Lebanese citizenship through decree, noting that such decrees are exceedingly rare given their effect on the country’s delicate sectarian balance.[5]
[18] Given such evidence, I find that the claimants do not have access to Lebanese citizenship. Though the PC and AC have lived for decades in Lebanon, I find that they do not have access to Lebanese citizenship because they are the children of Palestinian parents and the objective evidence establishes that the only pathway to Lebanese citizenship by naturalization is through decree – a discretionary and exceedingly rare occurrence. As such, I find that the PC, AC and MC#2 do not have the right to automatic Lebanese citizenship.
[19] And because I find that – specifically in this instance – the PC is not a Lebanese citizen, I conclude that the MC#1 also does not have access to Lebanese citizenship because she is not the child of a Lebanese father.
[20] Accordingly, I find that Lebanon is not a country of reference.
United Arab Emirates
[21] I find that the UAE is not a country of reference for the PC.
[22] As noted above, the PC is the child of Palestinian parents. An RIR for the Board states that “only children born to UAE fathers can acquire UAE citizenship at birth.”[6] Other documents indicate that, while Arabs from non-Gulf countries, can apply for naturalization in the UAE after residing for seven years in the country (and fulfilling other requirements), the naturalization decision is ultimately at the discretion of Emirati officials.[7]
[23] Based on such evidence, I find that the PC does not have automatic access to Emirati citizenship: Not only is he the son of a Palestinian father, he also has no automatic right to naturalization in the country because the process is discretionary, not automatic.
[24] Accordingly, I find that the UAE is not a country of reference for him.
Libya
[25] I do not find that Libya is a country of reference for the AC.
[26] The AC was born to Palestinian parents in Libya, where she lived for the first eight years of her life.
[27] Libya’s nationality law states that ius soli citizenship only extends to people who have been living on Libyan soil since 1951.[8] In this case, however, the AC’s Palestinian parents moved to Libya long after that because the AC’s father obtained a XXXX job in the country.
[28] For those born in Libya after 1951, Libyan citizenship is only granted if the child was born to a Libyan father or, if the father is stateless, to a Libyan mother as well.[9]
[29] But as noted above, both the AC’s parents are Palestinian, meaning I find that she does not have access to Libyan citizenship via her mother or her father.
[30] Accordingly, I do not find that Libya is a country of reference for her.
Oman
[31] I do not find that Oman is a country of reference for MC#2.
[32] The MC#2 was born in Oman in 2019 and has lived most of her life in the sultanate. However, the objective evidence establishes that the country does not bestow citizenship by birth; rather, citizenship is granted only by descent and only if the child’s father is an Omani citizen.[10]
[33] In this case, because the MC#2’s father (the PC) is a Palestinian and not an Omani citizen, I find that she does not have access to Omani citizenship.
Countries of Former Habitual Residence (CFHR)
[34] I find that the claimants have multiple CFHRs.
[35] In cases in which a claimant does not have a country of nationality, the panel is required to determine the claimant’s country, or countries, of former habitual residence. In determining what country or countries constitute “former habitual residences” in this claim, I considered where the claimant has resided and then considered whether, as stated by the Federal Court in Maarouf v. Canada, her relationship with the state during that period of residency was “broadly comparable to that between a citizen and his or her country of nationality.”[11] This implies a situation where a stateless person was admitted to a given country “with a view to continuing residence of some duration, without necessitating a minimum period of residence. The claimant must have established a significant period of de facto residence in the country in question.”
[36] The Federal Court of Appeal ruled in Thabet v. Canada that claimants with multiple countries of former habitual residence must show that, on a balance of probabilities, they would face persecution in any country of former habitual residence, and they cannot return to any other country of former habitual residence where they would not face persecution.[12]
[37] Lebanon
[38] I find that Lebanon is a CFHR for all the claimants. The adult claimants lived most of their lives there, MC#1 was born there and MC#2 moved there in 2022 as her father sought to find employment after losing his job in Lebanon.
[39] Accordingly, I find it is a CFHR for all four claimants.
United Arab Emirates
[40] I find that the UAE is a CFHR for the PC, because he lived there for two years to begin his life until his family moved back to Lebanon in around 1989.
Libya
[41] I find that the UAE is a CFHR for the AC, because she was born there to Palestinian parents and lived there for the first seven or eight years of her life before her family returned to Lebanon.
Mauritania
[42] I find that Mauritania is a CFHR for the PC because he lived and worked in the country for three years (2011-2014).
Oman
[43] I find that Oman is a CFHR for all four claimants because all four claimants lived there for a minimum of three years (2019-2022) – or longer, as in the case of the PC, AC and MC#1.
Summary of CFHRs
[44] I find that the claimants have multiple CFHRs: For the PC, the countries are the UAE, Lebanon, Mauritania and Oman; for the AC, they are Libya, Lebanon and Oman; and for the minor claimants, they are Lebanon and Oman.
Nexus
[45] I find the claimants have established a nexus to the Convention in the CFHR to which they can return: Lebanon.
[46] To satisfy the definition of a “Convention refugee” found in section 96 of the IRPA, a claimant must establish that they face a serious possibility of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion in their country of nationality.
[47] The claimants fear returning to Lebanon because of the deep, systemic discrimination they face as Palestinians in the country.
[48] Because I find that that allegation has a nexus to the Convention ground of nationality, I have assessed their claims according to section 96 of the IRPA.
Credibility
[49] I found the adult claimants (the only claimants to testify) to be credible witnesses.
[50] In line with the Federal Court’s decision in Maldonado v. Canada, a claimant’s sworn testimony creates a presumption that the individual’s allegations are true unless there is a reason to doubt their truthfulness.[13] In this case, I found the claimants to be credible, consistent, sincere and forthright in their testimony.
[51] The claimants testified about their despair of returning to Lebanon because they are denied fundamental rights, such as the right to work, own property or go to school. The PC noted he had been able to leave Lebanon and work as an XXXX overseas, but only because he was one of the lucky children from his refugee camp to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Otherwise, to help pay for expenses during school, he said he was forced to work informally in jobs like XXXX XXXX or XXXX due to the restrictions on Palestinian employment in other sectors.
[52] The PC also testified credibly about the difficulties Palestinians face in obtaining work around the region, noting that, whenever there is downsizing, it seems Palestinian workers are always the first to become laid off.
[53] The claimant also submitted documents in support of their claims. I give high weight to the following documents,[14] as I find them to be authentic and probative in establishing, on a balance of probabilities, the credibility of their allegations that the claimants are stateless Palestinians registered in Lebanon and that the PC lost jobs in Mauritania and Oman, meaning he (and in the case of Oman, the whole family) had to leave.
· Several identity documents, including international travel, census documents and family registrations from the UNRWA, identifying the claimants as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon;
· An employment letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX regarding the PC’s employment in Mauritania from 2011 to 2014;
· A termination letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX dated XXXX XXXX, 2022, notifying the PC that his employment with the company would end on XXXX XXXX, 2022, due to redundancy;
[54] I note that the claimants arrived in Canada via the United States, yet I do not find that this impugns the credibility of their subjective fear of their persecution in Lebanon. The PC testified that he had done his research ahead of time and concluded that Canada was the only destination in which he and his family could finally gain rights. Moreover, he said he worried that, because his wife wears the hijab, she could encounter problems in the United States. I accept these explanations, finding it reasonable that the claimants chose to claim in Canada since the family had, as a result of research, understood that Canada offered the best chance for a future without discrimination. Accordingly, I find that their failure to claim in the United States does not impugn the credibility of their subjective fear of persecution.
[55] Ultimately, I found the claimants’ testimony to be devoid of major inconsistencies, while I have also given significant weight to the aforementioned documents. In addition, I accept as reasonable the PC’s explanation as to why they did not claim asylum in the United States. As a result, I accept that the claimants are stateless Palestinians who have lived most of their lives in Lebanon, where they have faced systemic discrimination. Because of these findings of fact, I find that the claimants have established, on a balance of probabilities, that they have a genuine subjective fear of persecution in Lebanon.
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution in Lebanon
[56] Based on the claimants’ testimony and the available documentary evidence, I find that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon.
[57] The adult claimants testified that they were deprived of their fundamental rights, such as the right to work, in Lebanon because they are stateless Palestinians. I find that the National Documentation Package (NDP) provides an objective basis for their subjective fears of persecution in Lebanon as Palestinians.
[58] The Lebanese state denies Palestinian refugees their social, economic and political rights, under the pretext that granting civil rights to Palestinians would constitute a prelude towards their permanent settlement in Lebanon. Despite many legislative amendments throughout the years, Palestinian refugees are kept in an extremely vulnerable situation.[15]
[59] Palestinian refugees face institutional discrimination through socioeconomic deprivation and legal barriers denying them access to public education, public health care and social services, as well as restricted employment and property rights.[16]
[60] In all, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) notes that Palestinians are prevented from working more than 30 professions in the country. And even in occupations where they could theoretically work, the OHCHR notes, Palestinians “endure the near impossibility of working in permitted professions due to discriminatory measures.”[17]
[61] Palestinian refugees in Lebanon depend on the UNRWA for education, health and social services inside the 12 recognized refugee camps. The challenges faced by the Palestinian community in Lebanon have been worsened by the influx of Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees from Syria.[18]
[62] Palestinians are more at risk of “arbitrary detention,” “torture,” and “kidnapping” than Lebanese citizens. According to the U.S. Department of State says that Palestinian refugees are arrested arbitrarily and detained by state security forces and rival Palestinian factions.[19]
[63] And according to the European Commission, refugees subjected to arbitrary detention face “very poor conditions.” Palestinians are generally treated “more harshly” than Lebanese citizens by security services due to reasons including “racism and discrimination,” and the assumption, “often without basis,” that refugees collaborate with armed groups.[20]
[64] Given the totality of the evidence, I find that the claimants have established that they have a well-founded, forward-facing risk of persecution in Lebanon as stateless Palestinians.
Claimants Cannot Return to Other CFHRs
[65] I also find that the claimants also have no ability to return to their other CFHRs: the UAE, Libya, Mauritania and Oman.
United Arab Emirates
[66] I find the objective evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the PC cannot return to the country of his birth, the UAE.
[67] According to the General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs in Dubai, “All foreign nationals, whether visitors or residents, require a sponsor in the UAE. A sponsor is a UAE entity – individual or institution – who vouches for the foreigner and will carry out many vital functions on his or her behalf.” Similarly, a legal researcher interviewed by the Board states that Gulf states, including the UAE, generally prohibit “the entry of Palestinian refugees unless this is processed through a local agent, and they come for work purposes.”[21]
[68] Given such evidence, I find that the PC does not have the right to return to the UAE, since the objective evidence states that all foreigners – including Palestinians – can only come to live in the country if they have a sponsor.
Libya
[69] I find that the AC cannot return to Libya.
[70] I find the NDP for Libya does not provide any information regarding the ability of stateless Palestinians to return to the country. Nevertheless, I accept that the AC’s credible testimony on the matter, finding that it establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that she cannot return to Libya.
[71] The AC stated her father was a XXXX who was barred from working in Lebanon because he is Palestinian. As such, when the opportunity presented itself, he accepted a XXXX job in Libya. When he was laid off in about 2000, however, the AC had to return to Lebanon with her family. As far as she knows, she has no ability to return to Libya.
[72] The AC only lived in Libya as a minor dependent of her father, who was working on a XXXX contract until 2000. Given that I have no evidence indicating that the AC had any status in Libya other than that as the child of a temporary foreign worker who left the country 23 years ago, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the AC cannot return to Libya.
Mauritania
[73] I find that the PC cannot return to Mauritania.
[74] The objective evidence for Mauritania contains no information on the ability of stateless Palestinians to return to the country.
[75] Nevertheless, I find that the PC to be credible on his understanding of his status in the country. The PC stated that he worked for XXXX, which offered him a job in Mauritania in 2011. In Mauritania, however, the PC testified that he was just there on a limited work permit, meaning that when the project ended in 2014, he had no choice but to return to the refugee camp in Lebanon.
[76] I accept the PC’s testimony and disclosure[22] that he was in Mauritania as a foreign worker and that he had to leave when his employment ended. As such, I accept, on a balance of probabilities, that he has no ability to return to Mauritania because he no longer has employment in the country.
Oman
[77] I find that none of the claimants can return to Oman.
[78] The PC testified that he was able to move to Oman in 2015 because XXXX rehired him following his work for them in Mauritania. However, once he lost his job at the firm in Oman in XXXX XXXX2022, he said he had no choice but to leave, noting that companies are compelled to inform Omani authorities once they terminate foreign workers. After that, he said, foreigners have a prescribed amount of time to depart Oman.
[79] I find the NDP provides an objective basis for such testimony. As noted above, experts have noted that all Gulf countries, which includes Oman, typically prohibit “the entry of Palestinian refugees unless this is processed through a local agent, and they come for work purposes.”[23] Sources in the Oman NDP strike a similar chord: According to Bertelsmann Stiftung’s most recent available report for the country, “non-nationals do not enjoy the same benefits as Omanis do, due to rigid sponsorship (kafala) laws and regulations governing immigration and the residence of migrant workers and their relatives.”[24]
[80] As such, I find that, similarly to the UAE, the claimants cannot return to Oman as they do not have a sponsor there because the PC lost his job there in XXXX XXXX2022.
[81] Summary of Claimants’ Ability to Return to CFHRs
[82] In short, I find that the claimants do not have the ability to return to any of their CFHRs, including the UAE, Libya, Mauritania and Oman.
State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative in Lebanon
[83] Given that the Lebanese state is the primary agent of persecution, I find that there is no state protection available to the claimants. Furthermore, given that the mistreatment of Palestinian refugees is systemic throughout Lebanon, I find that there is no viable internal flight alternative available to them.
CONCLUSION
[84] For the forgoing reasons, I determine that the claimants are Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA; as such, the Board accepts their claims.
——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———
[1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
[2] Exhibit 2.
[3] Exhibit 1.
[4] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 3.6: Citizenship requirements and procedures for an individual who was born in Lebanon to parents with Syrian citizenship, has a permanent residency permit, and whose spouse was granted Lebanese citizenship by Decree (2012-November 2013). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 12 November 2013. LBN104652.E.
[5] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 3.6.
[6] Exhibit 3.3, National Documentation Package, United Arab Emirates, 31 March 2023, tab 3.2: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates: Work and residence permits; citizenship rights for children born to Syrians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 13 August 2014. ZZZ104924.E.
[7] Exhibit 3.3, National Documentation Package, United Arab Emirates, 31 March 2023, tab 3.5: Report on Citizenship Law: United Arab Emirates. European University Institute. Global Citizenship Observatory. Zeineb Alsabeehg; Yoana Kuzmova. November 2022. RSC/GLOBALCIT-CR 2022/07.
[8] Exhibit 3.2, National Documentation Package, Libya, 31 August 2023, tab 3.1: Law Number (24) for 2010/1378 on the Libyan Nationality. Libya. 2010.
[9] Exhibit 3.2, National Documentation Package, Libya, 31 August 2023, tab 3.1.
[10] Exhibit 3.4, National Documentation Package, Oman, 31 August 2023, tab 1.3: Oman. The World Factbook. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 8 March 2021.
[11] Maarouf v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 723 (T.D.); (1993), 23 Imm. L.R. (2d) 163 (F.C.T.D).
[12] Thabet v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 4 FCR 21 (C.A.).
[13] Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.).
[14] Exhibits 4, 5.
[15] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 2.2: Lebanon: A Human Rights Agenda. Amnesty International. 11 February 2019. MDE 18/9821/2019.
[16] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 13.6: Lebanon Livelihoods: Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Palestinians and Lebanese in the Shadow of the Syrian Crisis. Sharq.org; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Lorraine Charles. 2017.
[17] Exhibit 5.15.
[18] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 13.6.
[19] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 2.1: Lebanon. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022. United States. Department of State. 20 March 2023.
[20] Exhibit 3.1, National Documentation Package, Lebanon, 31 August 2023, tab 13.1: Treatment of Palestinian refugees, including information on identity documents, mobility rights, property rights, access to social services, education and employment, and living conditions. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 15 November 2011. LBN103848.E.
[21] Exhibit 3.2, National Documentation Package, United Arab Emirates, 31 March 2023, tab 14.2: Palestine and United Arab Emirates: residence status of stateless Palestinians, including access to employment, education, health care and other services, and the ability to travel in and out of the country; the requirements and procedures to … Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 24 November 2017. ZZZ106014.E.
[22] Exhibit 4.
[23] Exhibit 3.2, National Documentation Package, United Arab Emirates, 31 March 2023, tab 14.2.
[24] Exhibit 3.4, National Documentation Package, Oman, 31 August 2023, tab 1.4: BTI 2020 Country Report — Oman. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2020.