2023 RLLR 93

Citation: 2023 RLLR 93
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: November 9, 2023
Panel: Lesley Mason
Counsel for the Claimant(s): John Rokakis
Country: Haiti
RPD Number: TC2-33707
Associated RPD Number(s): N/A
ATIP Number: A-2024-00593
ATIP Pages: N/A

                                      

DECISION

 

INTRODUCTION

 

[1]       XXXXX (the claimant), a citizen of Haiti, seeks refugee protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the IRPA)1.

 

ALLEGATIONS

 

[2]       The specifics of the claim are set out in the claimant’s Basis of Claim Form (BOC);2 the following is a summary of his allegations.

 

[3]       The claimant was born on XX, 1996 in XXXXX, Haiti. The claimant is unmarried.

 

[4]       On XX XX, 2021 the claimant participated in a demonstration asking for justice for President Jovenel Moise, the president who had been assassinated in July 2021. Demonstrators were attacked by a group of bandits; the claimant was beaten with a baton.

 

[5]       On XX XX, 2021 the claimant received a call from his neighbour. The claimant was informed that armed bandits had attended his home and kidnapped his mother. The claimant’s mother has not been heard from since. The neighbour advised the claimant that he would be killed if he returned home. With the help of his father’ s friend, the claimant travelled north. The following day, armed bandits came north looking for the claimant. The friend of the claimant’ s father assisted the claimant in fleeing Haiti by boat.

 

[6]       The claimant arrived in Canada on XX XX, 2023 and made a claim for refugee protection shortly thereafter.

 

The Hearing

 

[7]       The hearing was held by videoconference using Microsoft Teams.

 

DETERMINATION

 

[8]       I find that the claimant, XXXXX, is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA based upon his political opinion.

 

ANALYSIS

 

Identity

 

[9]       The claimant’ s personal identity and country of citizenship have been established, on a balance of probabilities, as per a copy of his passport,3 his National Identity Card,4 and his birth certificate5.

 

Credibility

 

[10]     In assessing the credibility of the evidence presented by the claimant, I kept in mind the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Maldonado,6 wherein the Court stated, in part, “when a claimant swears to the truth of certain allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true unless there be reason to doubt their truthfulness.” I find the claimant to be generally credible.

 

[11]     I had some concerns regarding the claimant’ s oral testimony when compared with information in his BOC. For example, there were omissions in the claimant’s written narrative when compared to his oral testimony. I find in some instances this can be explained by embellishment on the claimant’ s part, such as when he testified that when he was in hiding, he learned from his former neighbours that the agents of persecution continued to search for him at his home. In other instance the omissions from his BOC, such as his membership in the Parti Haitien Tet Kale (PHTK), are found in the officer’ s notes in the port of entry notes and in Schedule A, question 7. I accept, as counsel submitted, that this information compliments the claimant’ s allegations in his written narrative of attending a protest seeking justice for the former leader of the PHTK.

 

[12]     More importantly, I found that the claimant’s testimony regarding his involvement with the PHTK was forthright and detailed. His testimony was internally consistent, and plausible with objective evidence. When asked, the claimant provided a cogent explanation for his motivation in joining the party. He described the party meetings he attended and described in detail what ensued at and after the protest he attended on XX XX, 2021 which led him to ultimately flee Haiti. There were no serious contradictions between the claimant’s testimony in this regard and information contained in his BOC narrative.

 

[13]     The claimant submitted a letter from his brother which provides evidence of the kidnapping of the claimant’ s mother and the lack of success of the family in locating his mother.7 I assign significant evidentiary weight to this letter.

 

[14]     As a result of this analysis, I find the claimant has on a balance of probabilities established his subjective fear. I have therefore considered the abject evidence in this claim.

 

Objective Evidence

 

[15]     I find that the objective evidence supports the claimant’s subjective fears. My reasons follow.

 

[16]     The June 5, 2023 report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)8 states the following:

 

Haiti, located on the western third of the island of Hispaniola and bordering the Dominican Republic, remains mired in interrelated political, security, and humanitarian crises. As of June 2023, Haiti lacks an elected president, legislature, and mayors following the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse9

 

 

Since Moïse’ s assassination, violent gangs have threatened to overwhelm the Haitian government and businesses, many of which have long been the gangs’ primary benefactors. The symbiotic relationship between the gangs in Haiti and the country’s political and economic elite is well established. Many of Haiti’s past presidents and other prominent politicians have used and received support from gangs. Generally, gangs provide political elites with services such as campaign support, voter intimidation, bribery, fundraising, vandalism, and disruption.10

 

[17]     One Response to Information Request (RIR) provides the following information.

 

“Criminal groups [are] often directed and used by the government in power.” When it is not possible to use the police “to attack or destroy an opponent,” leaders resort to Haiti: The situation of political parties and the treatment of political opponents, including… “criminals.” In “some areas,” “criminals prevent public gatherings.” 11

 

[18]     One BBC on-line article, issued December 5, 2022, provided by the claimant states the following:

 

Experts say that armed groups have ties to corrupt political figures – in power and in the opposition. They supply the gangs with weapons, or finance, or political protection. In return the gangs do their dirty work, generating fear, support, or instability, as required.12

 

[19]     Numerous independent documents report on the prevalence of kidnappings in Haiti.13

 

State Protection

 

[20]     For the following reasons I find there is no adequate state protection for the claimant in Haiti.

 

[21]     The country documents confirm that in most cases the police in Haiti are unable to help even if they were willing. An RIR from 2019 notes that Freedom House states there is “little protection from the illegitimate use of force”14 in Haiti. Another source states that “the Haitian population is left to its own devices and is powerless against the rise of insecurity in the country… no concrete measures have been taken by the authorities concerned to ensure the safety of citizens.”15 An Assistant Professor quoted in this RIR suggests that police officers do not engage in crime prevention, and rarely conduct criminal investigations. The Assistant Professor notes that they do not have confidence in their own ability/expertise to do so. The objective evidence suggests that the police are overwhelmed by rising insecurity and are unable to protect even their own staff.16

 

[22]     The judicial system is overburdened, under-resourced, and subject to a lack of oversight. The US Department of State (DOS) report notes that corruption plagues the system, resulting in underqualified individuals being appointed to positions, political tampering with process, and often impunity for certain individuals.17

 

[23]     In light of these weaknesses in state institutions, and given the profile of the agents of persecution, criminals providing support to political factions and some police as well, I find that adequate state protection would not be reasonably forthcoming to the claimant. I find that the presumption of state protection has been rebutted.

 

Internal Flight Alternative

 

[24]     The test for a viable IFA has two prongs. First, I must be satisfied that the claimant would not face a serious possibility of persecution and that they would not be personally subjected to a risk to life, of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or danger of torture in the IFA. Second, I must be satisfied that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refuge there. Once an IFA has been proposed, the onus is on the claimant to show that the IFA location is unreasonable, which requires the existence of conditions which would jeopardize their life and safety.

 

[25]     Haiti is a small country, of 11 million people contained within 27,750 square kilometers,18 which lacks adequate state protection. Country condition evidence suggests that communities in the country tend to be quite localized, meaning that locals take notice of newcomers to the area.19 During the hearing the claimant testified that his photograph was taken by the criminals attacking the protestors in XX 2021 and he could, thus, be identified by those opposed to his political views. 

 

[26]     An RIR on returnees to the country notes that freedom of movement in Haiti is restricted, and twenty-three armed gangs exist just in Port-au-Prince. Roads are dangerous, and police cannot access the victims of armed gangs who effectively control the civilian populations living in these areas.20

 

[27]     The 2002 report from Austrian Red Cross. Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation21 indicates that Human Rights Watch (HRW), in a March 2022 report notes that

 

Given the security conditions in Haiti, civil society groups and organizations assisting returnees expressed concern that people expelled or deported to Haiti are at risk of kidnapping and extortion by criminal gangs, which may believe returnees have money for travel or relatives abroad who can pay ransoms.

 

[28]     The Austrian Red Cross report also provides information from an IRB RIR:

 

In an August 2020 query response on the situation of Haitians returning to their country after having lived abroad, the IRB quotes several local sources that such individuals faced a higher risk of being targeted by criminals because they were “considered to be wealthy” or considered “to have access to money”. IRB notes that according to some sources, society might consider repatriated Haitians “criminals or wrongdoers”, as repatriation is often associated with being guilty of an offense (IRB, 27 August 2020).22

 

[29]     The claimant testified that the bandits are powerful and have a large sphere of influence. They kidnapped his mother and searched for him at his home in the north of the country where he was in hiding.

 

[30]     Given the small size of the country, the objective documentation on the difficulties of relocation, and the motivation and means of the bandits, including their past ability to locate the claimant after his relocation, I find that the claimant would face a section 96 risk throughout the country. I thereby find that there is no viable IFA in this claim.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[31]     As a result of the above analysis, I find the claimant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA. I accept his claim.

 

——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

 

1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27, sections 96, 97(l)(a) and 97(l)(b).

2 Exhibit 2

3 Exhibit 6

4 Exhibit 1

5 Exhibit 5

6 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister o fEmployment and Immigration) [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.),31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.)

7 Exhibit 6, p. 2-3

8 Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 1.3

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 4.1, RIR HTI20 l

12 Exhibit 7, pp. 12-20

13 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), items 1.8, 1.17, 1.19, 1.21, 1.23, 1.29, 1.31, 1.36, 1.41, 2.1, 2.2; Exhibit 7, pp. 8-20

14 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 10.2, RIR HTI106306.FE.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 2.1.

18 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 1.7.

19 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 14.1, RIR HTl200334.FE

20 Ibid.

21 Exhibit 3, NDP for Haiti, (September 29, 2023), item 1.41

22 Ibid.