2023 RLLR 99
Citation: 2023 RLLR 99
Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division
Date of Decision: November 21, 2023
Panel: C. Adolph
Counsel for the Claimant(s): Tina Hlimi
Country: Turkey
RPD Number: TC2 25778
Associated RPD Number(s): N/A
ATIP Number: A-2024-00593
ATIP Pages: N/A
DECISION
[1] XXXX XXXX is a citizen of Türkiye. He is claiming refugee protection pursuant to Sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)[1].
Preliminary Matters
[2] At the end of the hearing, counsel requested that she provide written submissions due to a time constraint on the hearing day. The panel accepted. Counsel’s submissions were provided on time[2] and were considered. The following week counsel made an application for post-hearing disclosure: she requested the panel recall that she had only recently been retained – the claimant had been unrepresented prior to her engagement – and therefore she had not been able to properly assist him in the gathering of documentary evidence to support his claim. The panel found the package submitted at Exhibit 10 was both relevant and probative. The panel also found that a reasonable explanation for the post-hearing disclosure had been provided. The panel therefore accepted the post-hearing disclosure.
ALLEGATIONS
[3] The claimant’s allegations are fully set out in his BOC form and narrative at Exhibit 2. In summary, he is making his claim on the basis of his Alevi religion and his opposition political opinion, as a supporter of the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) also known in English as the People’s Democratic Party. He fears persecution by the authorities in Türkiye.
DETERMINATION
[4] Having considered the totality of the evidence, the panel finds the claimant to be a Convention Refugee pursuant to section 96. He faces a serious possibility of persecution on a balance of probabilities on the basis of his religion and political opinion.
[5]
ANALYSIS
Identity
[6] The panel finds the claimant established his personal and national identity on a balance of probabilities. The panel relies on the copy of his Turkish national identity card and the copy of his passport’s identity page at Exhibit 8. Both documents contain the same national identity number, and I find this is sufficient to establish that he is who he says he is, and the country of reference is Türkiye.
[7] The panel did notify[3] the Minister because a US biometrics match returned a different passport number than the one the claimant supplied at Exhibit 4. The Minister replied[4] to say they had nothing to add and would not intervene in the claim. The panel asked the claimant for an explanation for this discrepancy, and he replied that he did not know. He testified that he had presented his one and only Turkish passport to the US authorities at the border with Mexico, and that they had taken it and not returned it to him. The panel accepts his response and description of the circumstances of his entry into the US. In the panel’s experience as a hearer of the claims of persons who transit into Canada via Mexico and the US, this kind of discrepancy between the number on their passport and the number entered by the US authorities occurs frequently and rarely do claimants have a full explanation. The panel notes that the US biometrics match provides a number, but no photograph of the passport it refers to. The panel finds this introduces the possibility of error. The panel draws no negative inference on the claimant’s identity and credibility and finds the claimant succeeded in establishing his identity on a balance of probabilities.
Nexus
[8] The panel finds there is a link between the claimant’s fear of return and the Convention grounds: religion and political opinion. The claim is assessed under s. 96.
Credibility
[9] A claimant is presumed to be credible unless there is reason for doubt. The panel found the claimant to be a credible witness. He testified in a clear, direct, spontaneous and unembellished manner about both his Alevi faith and his opposition political opinion. There were no inconsistencies, omissions or discrepancies of note. The panel found no reason to disbelieve him that the authorities perceive him as a political opponent because of his Alevi faith and his support for the Halkların Demokratik Partisi, (HDP), an opposition political party. His testimony is presumed to be true.
Alevi faith
[10] The claimant testfied that he is Alevi, that he has Alevi beliefs and values, that he is from an Alevi family and that the authorities view Alevis as opponents because Alevis do not have the same values as members of the Turkish Sunni majority. He testified he has attended at an Alevi ritual centre as part of his spiritual practice.
[11] The claimant provided a detailed letter from an Alevi spiritual leader, who also includes documentary evidence of his credentials as well as an identity card. In this lengthy letter, this Alevi leader states that he comes from a long family line of Alevi spiritual leaders, and that his father and grandfather all have known the claimant’s family over the years. The writer himself has known the family for two decades, and that the family has in the past offered their own home as an Alevi meeting place.
[12] I accept this documentary evidence and find that on a balance of probabilities, the claimant comes from an Alevi family.
[13] But the letter does not mention the claimant himself. As such the panel finds this letter does not directly corroborate the claimant’s allegation that he is a true believer, or that he is seen by the authorities as an Alevi.
[14] However, the writer states: “we the Alevis are still not sure whether to carry out our rituals in secrecy or in public. Simply because being blacklisted is a high risk for those Alevis attending open rituals in Alevi ritual centres that are not allowed to be registered as ritual centres, the police could detain all the people praying there with the accusation that they’re involved in illegal political (subversive or separatist) gatherings. Türkiye is a Muslim country, at least that is what it practically is. This means anyone who openly declares themselves as Alevi may be accused of being involved in “separatism” under the accusation that the prayers are aiming to divide the unity of the nation on sectarian lines.”
[15] I accept this this letter from an Alevi spiritual leader and give it full weight. I find on a balance of probabilities the meaning of this passage is that that, if found engaging in collective religious expression, Alevis are imputed by the authorities to have an opposition political opinion. I find this letter-writer established himself to be qualified to provide this evidence, since he established himself to be from a long line of Alevi spiritual leaders. On a balance of probabilities, he himself conducts Alevi rituals and therefore faces this risk himself. I also find this evidence to be corroborated by the objective evidence which will be discussed later. I therefore find that since the claimant testified credibly that he has attended Alevi houses of worship, on a balance of probabilities he faces a risk of being seen by the authorities as both an Alevi and a separatist political opponent.
Political involvement
[16] The claimant alleges that he is not an official member of the HDP, but that he is an active supporter of the party. The claimant provided a letter from his father at Exhibit 10 which discusses the claimant’s political involvement, to which the panel assigns full weight. On a balance of probabilities, the claimant is a supporter of the HDP as he alleges.
Subjective Fear
[17] The claimant testified to four arrests, in XXXX 2018, XXXX 2019, XXXX 2020 and finally, in XXXX 2021. The first three were for his pro-HDP political activity including XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX. The fourth arrest came minutes after he left the company of other pro-HDP volunteers. He testified that it was the treatment he received during this arrest that shook him: he provided details in his narrative. He testified, consistent with this narrative, that he was told he was involved with a separatist party. He was told he could only be released if he worked with the police in the future. Upon release, he testified, they told him to report to the police once a week, and also to show up whenever required. Upon release, he learned that family members who had gone out to police stations to look for him had also been detained. I find the claimant established his past arrests, that the police expect the claimant to report to them, and that on a balance of probabilities he has missed many reporting appointments by now. I find that on a balance of probabilities, his return without a passport would trigger official interest at the airport. I find the claimant has established his subjective fear of return.
Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
[18] The National Documentation Package contains several documents which report that people who oppose the current AKP government face persecution in Türkiye, and that Alevis and HDP supporters in particular face a risk from the authorities.
[19] The National Documentation Package lists multiple examples of the use of “terrorist” and “separatist” by the authorities to identify people with political opinions viewed as threatening. The US State Department[5] reports that even in the last year, there were credible reports of arbitrary killings, suspicious deaths of people in custody, arbitrary arrest and the continued detention of thousands of people viewed by the authorities as political opponents, often as “separatists” and often for purported ties to terrorism. Supporters of the claimant’s HDP are frequently dubbed separatists[6] and terrorists[7], though the HDP is an opposition political party and not a terrorist or separatist movement[8]. The panel accepts the objective evidence and finds that people viewed by the authorities as political opponents face a risk of charges on serious crimes which can result in long detentions and worse. The panel finds, based on the objective evidence and on a balance of probabilities this includes HDP supporters.
[20] In addition to suppressing opposition political movements, Turkish authorities have also enforced a view of the country as Sunni Muslim and ethnically Turkish. According to a report entitled The Myth of Tolerance[9] by the European University Institute, Türkiye sees itself as a Turkish Sunni Muslim nation. According to this report they can also expect harsh treatment if they are seen as going against the Sunni Turkish social order.
[21] Alevis are religiously different from Sunnis[10] and often ethnically and linguistically different from Turks, according to this report. Alevis often experience suppression of their religion. Alevi houses of worship are still not recognized by the authorities as legitimate: they have no legal status[11]. Police use harsher methods in neighborhoods with a large Alevi population[12]. Government attitudes are mirrored in public attitudes: there have been instances in which Alevi homes have been vandalized, with an X to imply the occupants should be killed, or with expressions such as “get out.” [13] The European court of Human rights has ruled that Türkiye violates the rights of Alevis[14]. The government denies Alevis the right to establish places of worship. The number of Alevi houses of worship in the country is not sufficient to meet the demand[15]. The panel accepts the documentary evidence and finds it establishes that Alevis are persecuted in Türkiye.
[22] The religious leader cited earlier states that Alevis found to be worshiping by the authorities can be accused of separatism, of trying to divide the country along sectarian lines. I find the objective evidence is consistent with this evidence, because it establishes that Türkiye sees itself as a Sunni nation and suppresses religions that are not Sunni Islam.
[23] The panel finds the objective evidence corroborates the claimant’s allegation that the authorities would see him upon return as an Alevi and pro-HDP political opponent. His subjective fear of return has an objective basis. He has a well-founded fear of persecution.
State Protection
[24] There is a presumption that a state can protect its own citizens unless it is in total breakdown. Türkiye is a functioning state. However, the panel finds that it would be objectively unreasonable for the claimant to seek the protection of the state given that the main agent of persecution is the state. The panel therefore finds, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, there is no adequate state protection for him.
Internal Flight Alternative
[25] Since the claimant fears the Turkish authorities, and they control the entirety of the country, the panel finds that the claimant would face a serious possibility of persecution throughout Türkiye, and accordingly there is no viable internal flight alternative available to him.
CONCLUSION
[26] Based on the totality of the evidence, the panel finds the claimant to be a Convention refugee on the grounds of his political opinion and religion. He faces a serious risk of persecution in Türkiye.
[27] His claim is accepted.
——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———
[1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, sections 96 and 97(1).
[2] Exhibit 9.
[3] Exhibit 5.
[4] Exhibit 6.
[5] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 2.1: Turkey (Türkiye). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022. United States. Department of State. 20 March 2023.
[6] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 4.16: Country Policy and Information Note. Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Version 4.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2020.
[7] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 1.10: General Country of Origin Information Report: Turkey. Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 March 2022.
[8] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 4.16: Country Policy and Information Note. Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Version 4.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2020.
[9] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 13.3: Comprehensive Report on Turkey: The Myth of Tolerance. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Ayhan Kaya. 2012.
[10] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.3: The Alevi faith, including principles, beliefs, traditions, and ritual practices (2019–November 2021). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 26 November 2021. TUR200820.E.
[11] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.10: Country Update: Turkey. Religious Freedom in Turkey in 2021. United States. Commission on International Religious Freedom. December 2021.
[12] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.2: Situation of Alevis, including political and religious rights; treatment of Alevis by society and authorities; state protection (2019–November 2021). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 3 December 2021. TUR200819.E.
[13] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.1: Turkey. International Religious Freedom Report for 2021. United States. Department of State. 2 June 2022.
[14] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.5: The Alevis’ fight for recognition in Turkey. Deutsche Welle. Tunca Ögreten. 26 January 2020.
[15] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.1: Turkey. International Religious Freedom Report for 2021. United States. Department of State. 2 June 2022.